- Dependencies, package sources, build identities, registries, or release artifacts are becoming harder to trust end to end.
- Customers or regulatory expectations are increasing pressure around SBOMs, provenance, signing, or third-party components.
- The company wants to strengthen build and release trust without adding controls that engineering cannot maintain.
Software Supply Chain Security
Assess the software factory: dependencies, build identities, package sources, SBOM practices, signing, provenance, registries, artifacts, and release trust.
Indicative USD baseline for a clearly bounded scope.
Calendar timing depends on access, evidence, target size, and stakeholder availability.
Scope, assumptions, deliverables, timeline, and price are confirmed before delivery begins.
No surprise hourly overages on agreed packaged work. If the scope changes materially, additional work is agreed in writing before it starts.
Recognize the decision before choosing the scope.
Where can trust break between source, dependency, build, artifact, registry, and release?
What level of SBOM, signing, provenance, and dependency governance is appropriate for this product?
Focused on the controls that change real product risk.
The exact evidence set is tailored during discovery. A typical engagement covers the areas below.
- Dependency governance and SCA coverage
- SBOM strategy and inventory quality
- Package, registry, and third-party component controls
- Build identities, runners, secrets, and source integrity
- Artifact signing, attestations, and provenance
- Release evidence, exceptions, and vulnerability response
A decision package — not a scanner export.
Recommendations are prioritized, contextualized, and structured so engineering and leadership can move from findings to action.
Included or adapted to the agreed engagement scope.
Included or adapted to the agreed engagement scope.
Included or adapted to the agreed engagement scope.
Included or adapted to the agreed engagement scope.
Included or adapted to the agreed engagement scope.
Included or adapted to the agreed engagement scope.
Clear scope. Evidence. Priorities. Remediation.
Goals, environment, constraints, evidence, and success criteria.
Technical and process assessment with targeted automation where useful.
Risk, attack paths, engineering effort, and business context.
Report, roadmap, workshop, and optional remediation validation.
Typical engagement: 1–3 weeks.
Know what changes, what is needed, and what can follow.
What changes after
- The software factory has a clearer chain-of-trust model and prioritized control gaps.
- SBOM and dependency practices are tied to real response and release decisions rather than document production alone.
What we need from you
- Representative repositories, build definitions, dependency tooling, package sources, registries, and release flow.
- Current SBOM, signing, provenance, artifact, or third-party component practices where they exist.
Natural next steps
Build a broader engagement.
Product Security Program Assessment
Know where your Product Security program stands — and what to improve first.
02Secure SDLC Assessment
Build security into the way software moves from idea to production.
03Secure Architecture & Threat Modeling
Find architectural risk before it becomes production vulnerability.
Bring the architecture, problem, or current security backlog.
We can define the smallest useful scope and a clear output before work begins.